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OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE IN THE SECOND RESTATEMENT
ROBERT BRAUCHER*
TENTATIVE Draft No. 1 of the Restatement of Contracts Second was ap-
proved by the American Law Institute at its 1964 annual meeting, and it seems
appropriate to make a report of progress. As the reporter, I am in no position to
evaluate; but I can perhaps describe the work in briefer compass than the 300
pages of the draft, and can give some account of the nature and purpose of
the project as seen by those engaged in it. Such an account is peculiarly ap-
propriate in a collection of essays dedicated to Professor Corbin. He was a
special adviser for the original Restatement and reporter for part of it; as
consultant for the Restatement Second he has provided a critical review of
the original which has been the foundation on which the revision has proceeded.
The Restatement of Contracts was begun in 1923, with Professor Williston
as reporter, and the two volumes published in 1932 were the first completed
product of the work of the Institute. Sections 19-74, dealing with offer and
acceptance, were discussed at the annual meeting in 1925. At that time it was
contemplated that the Institute would publish a supporting treatise, but the
preparation of treatises was left to the individual efforts of the reporters and
others. The result is that in the later restatements, and even more in the Re-
statement Second, the role of the comment has been expanded to provide a
context for the summary statement in black letter. I
The expanded comments explain the bases of the rules stated in black letter
and give warning of variations from the stated rules which have been effected
by statute or decision. Particular effort has been made to reconcile both black
letter and comment with related parts of other restatements and with such
statutory formulations as the Uniform Commercial Code, and to provide ap-
propriate cross-references.
The basic organization and structure of the original Restatement have been
preserved, and the subject matter dealt with under particular section numbers
has been changed as little as possible. But stylistic and terminological changes
in black letter have been freely made in the interest of clarity and consistency,
and substantive changes .have not been limited to legal developments since
the publication of the original Restatement. Because of the existence of the
monumental Williston and Corbin treatises, documentation has not been made
exhaustive; but citations to illustrative cases and to secondary materials are
given in Reporter's Notes in the style inaugurated in the Restatement Second.
*Professor of Law, Harvard University.
1. For accounts of the history of the Restatement see Lewis, History of the American
Law Ibstitute and the First Restatement of the Law, in RESTATEMENT IN THE COURTS
1-23 (Penn. ed. 1945) ; Goodrich, The Story of the American Law Institute, 1951 WAsu.
U.L.Q. 283. For a critical review, see HART AND SACHS, Tn LEGAL PROCSSs: BASIC
PROBLEMaS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 748-71 (tentative ed. 1958).
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In short, the main innovations in the revision may be described as stylistic
rather than substantive. But it should not be surprising that a stylistic revision
may be symptomatic of fundamental shifts in modes of thought. The crisply
authoritative style of the original not unnaturally tended to reflect the doctrinal
temper of the latter part of the nineteenth century. Explanation and rationaliza-
tion, in contrast, are likely to force attention to social change, to produce
qualification and restraint in the interest of realism, and to end in reliance
on utilitarian ideals. All these tendencies can be discerned in the later restate-
ments, and the Restatement of Contracts Second is no exception.
Professor Williston provided a bridge between the contrasting dogmatisms
of 0. W. Holmes and C. C. Langdell, on the one band, and the focus of mid-
twentieth-century thought on purpose and function, on the other. Twenty-
five or thirty years ago a fundamental element in a sound legal education vas
the discovery that the conservatism of Williston and the modernism of Corbin
were hard to distinguish in specific result. Yet Corbin was acceptable to the
"realists" of the 1930's as Wiliston was not.2 Philosophic discussion too has
its deposit, somewhat disguised perhaps, in the Restatement of Contracts
Second. Indeed, philosophy may be an essential ingredient; it may not be an
accident that the list of Contracts men include so many professors of juris-
prudence: Beutel, Franklin, Fuller, Gilmore, Havighurst, Jones, Kessler,
Patterson, Sharp. I limit myself to survivors who are my elders and betters.
A word must also be said about the late Karl N. Llewellyn, romantic3 self-
styled "realist," and Corbin disciple in both jurisprudence and contracts, whose
work has particular relevance to restatement of the law of offer and acceptance.
In a series of articles published in 1938 and 1939, he attempted a compre-
hensive analysis of the law of offer and acceptance, criticized "modern ortho-
dox" doctrine as found in the first Restatement, and made numerous sugges-
tions for modification in concept, doctrine, and approach.4 Beginning the next
year, with Corbin as one of his advisers, he worked most of those suggestions
into the Uniform Revised Sales Act, which became Article Two of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, and is now law in 29 states and the District of
Columbia.5
2. See Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realisnn - Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARv. L. REv. 1222, 1235 n.36 (1931), citing Corbin, The Law and the Judges, 3 YAMn
REV. 234 (n.s. 1914).
3. See, e.g., Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARv. L. Rmy. 873,
894 (1939) : "the theme of forward contract which had been rumbling in the bass gets
picked up by the violins and then the brass.'
4. See Llewellyn, The Rule of Law in Our Case-Law of Contract, 47 YATE L.J. 1243
(1938) ; Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance (Part I & II),
48 YALE L.J. 1, 779 (1938-39) [hereinafter cited as LLEW.LLYN]. A promised fourth
article which was to provide documentation, see LLEvELYx at 818, never appeared, per-
haps because his efforts were diverted to the Uniform Commercial Code.
5. Llewellyn was the chief reporter throughout. See Braucher, The Legilative His-
tory of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUm. L. Rav. 798 (1958).
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Against this background, let us turn to more specific matters. The discussion
below follows roughly the order in which problems first appear in the Restate-
ment, but assembles the later related sections.
Unilateral and bilateral contracts. Llewellyn's central concern in his 1938-39
articles was the "Great Dichotomy" between unilateral and bilateral contract:
"the classical dichotomy in Offer and Acceptance," he said, "has little relation
to the living fact of the business contracting which it divides.",, In a preliminary
draft of the Restatement of Contracts Second, the reporter sought to introduce
similar concern by way of comment to the definitions of unilateral and bilateral
contracts in Section 12. Discussion with the advisers led instead to deletion of
the unilateral and bilateral definitions and to the use of substitute phrases
such as "acceptance by performance" and "acceptance by promise."
The reasons for this decision appear in the Reporter's Note to Section 12
in Tentative Draft No. 1, which the reporter is not in a position to paraphrase
or improve:
Section 12 of the original Restatement defined unilateral and bilateral
contracts. It is deleted because of doubt as to the utility of the distinction,
often treated as fundamental, between the two types. As defined in the
original Restatement, "unilateral contract" included three quite different
types of transaction: (1) the promise which does not contemplate a bar-
gain, such as the promise under seal to make a gift; (2) certain option
contracts, such as the option under seal (see Sections 24A, 45) : and (3)
the bargain completed on one side, such as the loan which is to be repaid.
This grouping of unlike transactions was productive of confusion.
.Moreover, as to bargains, the distinction tends to suggest, erroneously,
that the obligation to repay a loan is somehow different if the actual de-
livery of the money was preceded by an advance commitment from the
obligation resulting from a simultaneous loan and commitment. It also
causes confusion in cases where performance is complete on one side
except for an incidental or collateral promise, as where an offer to buy
goods is accepted by shipment and a warranty is implied. Finally, the
effect of the distinction has been to exaggerate the importance of the type
of bargain in which one party begins performance without making any
commitment, as in the classic classroom case of the promise to pay a re-
ward for climbing a flagpole.
The principal value of the distinction has been the emphasis it has
given to the fact that a promise is often binding on the promisor even
though the promisee is not bound by any promise. This value is retained
in new Section 24A on option contracts. But the terms unilateral and
bilateral are not used in the statement of rules in this Restatement as
revised.
7
Manifestation of mutual assent. In the Restatement Second, as in the original,
Sections 20-23 are devoted to the general concept of "agreement," defined
in Section 3 as a "manifestation of mutual assent." That phrase embodies the
'objective" theory that it is in general the deed rather than the thought that
6. LLEvLLYx 787, 789.
7. RESTATEMENT (ScoND), CoNtmacTs § 12, Reporter's Note (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1964).
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counts, and that one can agree by negligently appearing to agree. Professor
Whittier observed that the theory was an innovation introduced about 1850,
and doubted its wisdom.8 But he seemed to concede that it is now so imbedded
in our law that it would take more than a restatement to eradicate it. It remains
undisturbed in the revision.
Accurate statement of the principle governing responsibility for unintended
appearance of assent poses some difficulty. In the original Restatement, Sec-
tion 20 required "intent to do" the acts by which assent is manifested, but
"neither mental assent to the promises in the contract nor real or apparent
intent that the promises shall be legally binding." Section 70 provided for
binding a party to a writing "which he should reasonably understand to be
an offer or a proposed contract," even though he is "ignorant of the terms
of the writing or of its proper interpretation." Section 71 made the undisclosed
understanding of a party material in certain cases of "uncertain or ambiguous"
manifestations of intent.
All this is rewritten in the Restatement Second. According to Section 21,
"conduct of a party is not effective as a manifestation of his assent unless lie
intends to engage in the conduct and knows or has reason to know that the
other party may infer from his conduct that he assents." The new black
letter refers to the possibility of avoidance for mistake or other invalidating
cause in cases of no assent in fact. The standard of what the party "knows or
has reason to know" is carried through in a new Section 21A on misunder-
standing. Intent to be legally bound is the subject of a new Section 21B. At
Professor Corbin's instigation the scope of the parol evidence rule in this
context and the propriety of a rule conditioned on "ambiguity" are left to the
later chapter on the scope and meaning of contracts. The new comments and
illustrations expand on the problems of sham or jest, assent by conduct as
in cases of services in the home, mistake of one party of which the other
party knows or has reason to know, gentlemen's agreements, social engage-
ments, and domestic arrangements. The net effect is to give a rather more
central position to concepts based on the case of the two ships Peerless than
might result from rigorous distinction between equivocation and vagueness.
The concept that assent must be "mutual" also requires exposition. The
original Section 23 required "that there should be a proposal by the offeror
to the offeree, and that the offeree should know that a proposal has been made
to him." Section 53 required in addition that the whole consideration requested
by an offer be given "after the offeree knows of the offer." Exception was
made for negligent manifestation of assent to a writing which tile offeree
"should reasonably understand to be an offer." (Section 70) The revised
version requires instead that each party manifest assent "with reference to"
8. WVhittier, The Restatement of Contracts and Mutual Assent, 17 CA.LTr. L. REV.
441, 442 (1929).
9. Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 Hurl. & Co. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Fx. 1864); see
Young, Equivocation in the Making of Agreements, 64 CoLTm. L. REv. 619, 647 (1964).
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the manifestation of the other, leaving the effect of misunderstanding to the
standard of what each party "knows or has reason to know" under the new
Section 21A. Section 53 is limited to cases where performance is complete
before the offeree learns of the offer. Comments and illustrations deal with
cases of unrecognized offers, unknown offers of reward, cross offers, and
unknown terms.
Offer; option contract. The definition of offer in Section 24 has been re-
written to take account on non-promissory offers.' 0 "Option" is relabelled
"option contract" in the interest of clarity, and transferred to a new Section
24A. Sections 46 and 47, which overemphasized a bootless distinction between
irrevocable offer and collateral contract not to revoke, are omitted. A new
Section 35A is added to state the rule that termination of the power of ac-
ceptance under an option contract is governed by the requirements for discharge
of a contractual duty. Section 64(b), following the cases, newly excepts option
contracts from the rule that an acceptance is operative on dispatch.
These matters are elaborated and explained in comments. The related suc-
ceeding sections are treated similarly, without great change of substance.
Thus Section 25 on preliminary negotiations is rephrased and the comment
expanded. Following a Llewellyn suggestion," a paragraph is added to the
comment to Section 26 to indicate circumstances which may be helpful in
determining whether a contract has been concluded where a written memorial
is contemplated but has not been executed. Section 27 on auctions is revised
to conform to Section 2-328 of the Uniform Commercial Code, and comment
paragraphs are added to deal with analogous invitations to bidders and with
the effect of published and announced terms.
Invitation of promise or performance. Sections 28-31 continue to embody
an element of the orthodoxy that troubled Llewellyn: the offeror is master of
his offer.' 2 But rephrasing and comment reduce the significance of that prin-
ciple; and a new Section 29(2), following UCC Section 2-206(1), states
a countervailing presumption that "an offer invites acceptance in any manner
and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances."13 In Section 31 the
former presumption that an offer invites the formation of a bilateral contract
is replaced by a presumption that the offeror is indifferent whether acceptance
takes the form of words of promise or acts of performance. This change follows
a suggestion of Professor Whittier which was adopted by Professor Llewellyn
and incorporated in UCC Section 2-206(1).14 The requirement of notification
10. See Goble, The Non-Promissory Offer, 48 Nw. U. L. REv. 590 (1953).
11. LLEwELLYN at 14.
12. LLEWELLYN at 780.
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONTRACTS § 29(2) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964). Com-
pare LLEWELLYN 788; UNIFORx RLvISED SALEs AcT 124-125 (Proposed Final Draft No.
1, 1944).
14. See Whittier, The Restatement of Contracts and Mutual Assent, 17 CALIF. L. Rv.
441, 453 (1929) ; LLEmL.YN at 809.
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to the-offeror is treated separately, as Llewellyn urged;1U it is discussed here-
after.
To illustrate:
An order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or current shipment
normally invites -acceptance either by a prompt promise to ship or by
prompt or current shipment. Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-206
(1) (b). If non-conforming goods are shipped, the shipment may be an
acceptance and at the same time a breach. But there is no acceptance
if the offeror has reason to know that none is intended, as where the
offeree promptly notifies him that non-conforming goods are being shipped
and are offered only as an accommodation to him.16
This concept of an offer to enter into a contract which may be either uni-
lateral or bilateral did not appear in the original Restatement. Performance
or tender in response to "an offer for a unilateral contract" bound the offeror
under Section 45: he could not revoke once the offeree began to climb the
flagpole. But Section 63 applied if the "offer requests a promise from the
offeree;" performance or tender in such a case created a contract even though
there was a violation of the basic principle that the offeror is master of his
offer. Hence ekceptions were required in Sections 52 and 59, which stated
that an acceptance must comply with the requirements of the offer.
The recognition that an offer may invite the offeree to choose between
acceptance by promise and' acceptance by performance makes possible a more
elegant statement without change of practical result. The flagpole case in
the Restatement Second involves an offer which "invites an offeree to accept
by performance and does not invite a promissory acceptance;" Section 45,
providing for an option contract, is limited to such cases. Cases where the
offeree is invited to choose are left to Section 63: here acceptance by perform-
ance "operates as a promise to render complete performance," and both parties
are bound. Exceptions to the principle that the offeror is master of his offer
are eliminated, and the purity of the concept of voluntary agreement is re-
tained.' 7 As the comment adds, these rules of course yield to manifestations
of contrary intention.
Certainty. According to Section 32 of the original Restatement, offer and
acceptance must be such "that the promises and performances to be rendered
by each party are reasonably certain." Section 33 then provided for the creation
of a contract "by entire or partial performance on the part of the offeree"
under an indefinite agreement. The Restatement Second preserves both prin-
ciples, but expands both black letter and comment. The net effect, harmonizing
with the Uniform Commercial Code and with a growing body of authority,
tends toward greater toleration of indefiniteness and more readiness to enforce
agreements where the parties intended to be bound.
15. LLEwE Yx at 32 n.61, 812, 814 n.53.
16. REsTATEmENT (SEcoND), CowrmAcrs § 31 Comment c (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964).
17. This meets the objections to the original § 63 raised in Goble, Is Performance
Always as Desirable as a Promise to Perform? 22 IL.r. L. REv. 789 (1928).
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The new Section 32 distinguishes between uncertainty which shows that
the parties had not intended their conduct to be understood as offer or ac-
ceptance and uncertainty which defeats their mutual intention to be bound.
As to the latter, following UCC Section 2-204(3),18 the black letter provides
a new standard: Do the terms of the contract provide a basis for determining
the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy? As the com-
ment puts it, "contracts should be made by the parties, not by the courts," but
where the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably
certain basis for granting a remedy, "the same policy supports the granting of
the remedy." A corollary was troubling to some of the orthodox in the ALI:
"the degree of certainty required may be affected by the dispute which arises
and by the remedy sought .... It is less likely that a reasonably certain term
will be supplied by construction as to a matter which has been the subject of
_ controversy between the parties than as to one which is raised only as an
afterthought."
As to the effect of part performance, the new Section 33 distinguishes be-
tween the removal of uncertainty and the effect of reliance in making a remedy
appropriate even though uncertainty is not removed. It also provides for
choice of terms in the course of performance, and the comment refers to implied
limitations set by reasonableness, good faith, and standards of fair dealing.10
Notification of acceptance. In the original Restatement, Section 55 required
that "an act or forbearance" requested "as the consideration for an unilateral
contract" be given "with the intent of accepting the offer." Section 56 stated
that the acceptance was complete without notification, but that in some circum-
stances failure to notify would discharge the contract. No similar provision
was made for bilateral contracts unless it was implicit in Section 52 or Section
58. Section 52 stated in effect that acceptance by promise was not operative
"until that promise is expressly or impliedly given;" Section 58 required
acceptance to be "unequivocal."
The revision makes explicit the requirement of notification, and eliminates
the reference to "intent" to accept.2 0 The new Section 52 divides acceptances
into acceptances by performance and acceptances by promise, and defines ac-
ceptances by performance to include an acceptance by a performance which
operates as a return promise. Section 55 (2) negates acceptance by performance
where the performing offeree exercises reasonable diligence to notify the
offeror of nonacceptance, except where the offeree takes the benefit of offered
18. See also UCC §§ 2-305, 2-309, 2-311. For an application of § 2-204(3), see Penn.
sylvania Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 166 A.2d 726 (Del. Ch. 1960).
19. See UCC 88 1-102(3), 1-203, 2-103(1)(b), 2-302; Farnsworth, Good Faith
Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30
U. Cm. L. REv. 666 (1963) ; Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts,
64 COLUm. L. Rxv. 833, 855-61 (1964). For recent application of § 2-302 to deny enforce-
ment of an "unconscionable" contract in a case not.involving uncertainty, see American
Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maclver, 201 A.2d 886 (N.H. 1964).
20. Compare text at note 25 infra.
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goods or services or where prior conduct of the offeree justifies the offeror in
inferring assent. Section 55(3) negates acceptance by performance where a
promissory acceptance is not invited if before the offeror performs his promise
the offeree rejects the offer. Section 56 carries forward the provision for dis-
charge by failure to notify, but dispenses with notification if the offeror learns
of the performance within a reasonable time or if the offer indicates that notifi-
cation is not required.
Similar provisions are newly made for acceptance by promise.2 , A new
Section 57A states that notification is "essential to an acceptance by promise"
unless the offeror seasonably receives the acceptance or the offeree takes the
benefit of offered goods or services or the offer manifests a contrary intention.
Section 58 on equivocal acceptances is limited to cases where notification is
essential, and protects the offeror who reasonably understands an equivocal
communication as an acceptance.
The mailbox rule. The new provisions on notification may render unnecessary
Section 64, providing that an acceptance is operative when put out of the
offeree's possession. But in the interest of clarity Section 64 is retained sub-
stantially unchanged except for an added provision for option contracts. An
expanded comment rationalizes the rule in terms of the offeree's need for
"a dependable basis for his decision whether to accept,"22 and distinguishes
cases of (1) revocation of offer, where that rationalization applies directly,
(2) loss or delay in transit, where the rule rests on simplicity and symmetry
rather than demonstrated convenience, (3) revocation of acceptance, where
the problem is one of the offeree's speculation at the offeror's expense, and
(4) application of tax and regulatory laws, choice of law, venue of litigation,
and other miscellaneous issues.
Professor MacNeil has recently expressed regret that Section 64 "is still
worded as a unitary rule."23 He contrasts the black letter with the comment,
suggesting that "the comments constitute a basis for some workable principles,
but that the blackletter rule continues to invite the application of obscurantist
fictions." 24 With deference, it may be suggested that the comment is not so
out of harmony with the black letter as he indicates, and that his goal of judicial
candor may be promoted rather than retarded by simplicity of rule. Elsewhere
he suggests that "the dispatch rule," coupled with the law of mistake, may
resolve some of the problems satisfactorily.2 5 Much the same point is made
in the comment to Section 64, and it may be that he should hold his fire until
the Restatement Second has reached the subject of mistake.
21. See LLEWru.yLy at 812.
22. See Nussbaum, Comparative Aspects of the Anglo-American Offer-and-Accept-
ance Doctrine, 36 COLUm. L. REv. 920 (1936).
23. MacNeil, Time of Acceptance: Too Many Problens for a Single Rule, 112 U. PA.
L. REv. 947, 979 n.91 (1964).
24. Ibid.
25. Id. at 972. For a recent case of first impression supporting the unitary rule, see
Morrison v. Thoelke, 155 So. 2d 889 (Fla. App. 1963).
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Acceptance by silence. Section 72 on acceptance by silence or exercise of
dominion is a fair average illustration of the revision technique. The black
letter has been subjected to minor revision, but the principal innovation is in
expanded comment. The offeree's unexpressed intent continues to be given
effect when the offeror invites acceptance by silence, despite Llewellyn's sug-
gestion that "in a systematics centering on overt manifestations" this is "almost
lewd ;,,26 but the comment follows his injunction to recognize that "sometimes
courts hold one party to an envisaged mutual obligation when they will not
hold the other" and to try "to get the reasons stated." The phrasing with
respect to prior conduct of the offeree is revised to harmonize with the com-
mon reference to "duty to speak" in judicial discussion. And involuntary ac-
ceptance by exercise of dominion is limited by excluding offered terms which
are "manifestly unreasonable," as suggested by Professor Whittier.' 7 The
comment ties the stated rules to basic concepts of unjust enrichment and
detrimental reliance.28
The foregoing does not exhaust the matters considered or the changes made
in the reformulation of the law of offer and acceptance in the Restatement
Second. It does enumerate the principal subjects of controversy during the
course of the work, and it is hoped that it gives some clue to method and spirit.
If an impression is conveyed that the reporter is not entirely dissatisfied, that
is probably inevitable. If the impression is added that caution and restraint
are thought appropriate, that is no accident at all. But conservative tenderness
for tradition and precedent should not be mistaken for fear.
26. LLEWELLYN at 801 n.35.
27. Whittier, The Restatement of Contracts and Mutual Assenft, 17 CAMiF. L. IRLs.
441, 452 (1929).
28. See Laufer, Acceptance by Silence: A Critique, 7 DuxE L.J. 87 (1939).
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